I. Introduction
Constitutional lawyers see m to have left to political science the question: What is so re pugnant about power itself, as to justify unending restraint efforts? We should briefly re vert to this issue, as a basis for an argument to be formulated from the African perspecti ve of power, and of its control through adopted Western concepts of parliamentarism. Preston King typifies political power as Hthe ultimate self-conscious focus of the com munity's coherence«.l It fo llows that this power exists as af ait accompli and has a vital role in the community. Wh ether it must be controlled depends on whether it has a mis chief potentia1.2 King observes that political leaders, in the exercise of power, will con ceive and pursue particular objects, following which they will invite conformity with po licy decisions already taken. HConformity ... is sometimes reached by threat of force, . .. promises of reward; somethimes by lies, sometimes by frank avowal of truth ... «3 As Cruise O'Brien remarks, Hthe person who is applying power, even in the very mild and weil accepted form ... is at least in danger of arrogance and other forms of distor tion«.4 This consideration, wh ich appears to be the basis of the constitutional lawyer's concern, is amply validated by the actuality of arrogance and derournement de pouvoir that must become manifest from this article, which attempts to derive fresh insights5 from a Judi cial Commission of Inquiry Report recently published in Nairobi, Kenya.6 11. The existing Relationship between the legislature and the Executive I have elsewhere7 considered the parliamentary experience in a nNew Commonwealth« and in a francophone African country, attempting to identify certain peculiar features of executive power there; and the information thus gained may be taken as a point d'app ui from which we may now set out in more affirmatory terms the present state of parlia mentary control of government.8 Many African countries set off at independence as if they earnestly believed in the vir tues of the Western parliamentary system . Hence the provision for such cJassical par liamentary devices as multi-party systems, the vote of censure, etc. But it soon became cJear that a certain political profile, quite the antithesis of the setting at independence, was beginning to emerge. The kind of political stability Africa had opted fo r, it was be coming evident, did reckon without the role of a plurality of parties; it was a conception of stability built on a fixed foundation, consisting in a President at the helm of a single party -what has aptly been typified as n[un pays] fortement organist! et uni autour d'un chef«.9 Practice shows that there were two alternatives to that position: the suppression of civi lian rule and its substitution with military dictatorship; or the maintenance of a nominal multi-party system that would serve no more than a public relations function. lO Assuming that practice could take one of the three positions (rather than some theoreti cal fu rther alternative), it is arguable that it is the first that merits recognition as the mo del of nrational« post-independence African tradition: not any of the other two, the one of which implies acceptance of undisguised dictatorship, even as the other entails obvious want of political candour. Sut the nrational« position is itself fraught with the danger of abuse of power. Unlike Western countries, where the plenitude of executive powers has undisputed legal authori ty only in situations of national emergency or other specified types of crisis, 11 the powers Op. ci!. supra n. 5. It is admitted that this perspective cannot hope to be perfectly representative as it would not accurately describe the position in countries where military rule prevails (e. g. Nigeria, Ghana, Bourkina Fasso, Central African Republic, Liberia, etc.), nor in distinctly revolutionary situations (as in Mozambique or Ethiopia), nor in such countries as South Africa, Libya, etc. -countries with certain distinct local peculiarities. 9 Journal OfJiciel de la Republique de Clite d'Ivoire -Debats de L'Assemblee Nationale. September 12, 1966, p. 5 [»Discours du President elu«l. 10 Military regimes abound in Africa (n. 8, supra). As to the alternative of the public-relations plurality of parties, Botswana, Gambia, Senegal and Uganda are notable. In Botswana, the popular example of multi party democracy, the role of opposition groupings in the constitutional order is strikingly marginal. .. «13 The basic reason usually advanced for this concentration is that it is an essential basis for national development -a factor though to be largely absent in Western countries, thus making for a diffe ring political arrangement from that known in the West. »National Development« in this respect normally refers, fi rst, to the process of creating political harmony and of developing a national consciousness; and, secondly, to the efforts to en hance the country's economic activities and improve access to goods and services, in the interest of the citizens. lt is thought the constitutional organ in whose domain such major intiatives fa ll, the executive, ought to have a broad-enough competence for the taking of policy decisions and for implementation of policy. (There are, of course, other justifica tions, for instance, traditional styles of government which gave broad competence, and sometimes unfettered powers to the leader).14 Now in spite of the obvious potential for abu se of powers in their very nature so nebu lous, no eJJective constitutional arrangements exist Jo r their restraint. lt has been shown15 that tradition al control devices such as judiciaries (of the British type), tribu naux administratijs (of the French type), public inquiries, Ombudsmen, etc. are either few and fa r between, or, even where they exist, are purely symbolic and unequal to the task of bringing under check excessive of executive power. Such fo rmless and ubi quitous powers hardly !end themselves to effective control by procedure-oriented insti tutions. The legislature alone, of all the power-control devices available, could conceiva bly offer an appreciable prospect of restraint. It is now known, however, that what measure of control the legislature could bring to bear, is entirely outside the tradition al Western scheme of parliamentary gouvernment. It appears correct to say that the quintessence of the Western scheme consists in the mul ti-party system, a sociological fact, which sprouts into the [constitutional-legalJ parlia mentary chamber (thanks to parliamentary elections by-and-Iarge contested on the basis of party sponsorship which is itself governed by a commitment to party »ideologycc), and there constitutes the recognised basis of choice in, and orientation of, parliarnent's con stitutional fu nctions (incIuding the function of power restraint). Whether, and to what extent, the Western legislature will bring the executive to account, in the matter of power exercised, depends on the party lines represented in the legislature itself. Depending on the opposition parties' attitude towards the conduct of administration, and on whether they are united by a common cause, the ultimate sanction of the vote of no confidence could come into play, and where it is successful, the executive may fall, along with its sponsoring party, on account of abuse of power. 16 While not suggesting that the problem of power control has disappeared in the Western countries, 17 one notes that parliament's control function in those countries is more than just theoretical: it is certainly grounded on certain effective devices, supported by availa ble sanctions. Legislative control of executive power in a one -party state (de jure or de fa cto), wh ich is the lot of African countries, represents a wholly unorthodox picture and must be under stood in that light. The one-party parliament lacks the basic equipment with its con straints and sanctions, for effectively calling the executive to account for its policies, acts or exercises of power. Owing to the monolithic character of such a parliament, there is no active unit within its make-up, with the motivation, initiative, even capacity, to take exception to the government line, let alone articulate such a difference as a policy matter and dress it up in efficacious sanctions. More importantly, the government line represents the party line, from which the parlia mentarian (who must be a member ofthe party) deviates at this own peril, as he may suf fer revocation of his registration as a party member, whith the automatic consequence of loss of the parliamentary seat.18 Besides, the vote of no confidence, the traditional parlia mentary weapon, becomes impossible to employ in so far as no dissenting opinion, sup ported by an identifiable group of parliamentarians possessed of a determinative vote, can be articulated and given effect. Thus, even in those countries19 that have a provision for the no-confidence vote, in practice, this cannot be exercised and remains lettre morte. (It may be added that, even assuming such provisions could be employed by parliament, technicalities exist which conclusively seal their fate as totally otiose.) As has been pointed out elsewhere, the purpose of the no-confidence vote in a one-party state is to call upon the electorate, as arbiter, to resolve some major difference between the executive and the legislature: ticket. If such an election were to take place fo llowing a vote of no confidence, the same men who have been denied the confidence of Parliament would be involved in the party work of nominating candidates ... The same men would also determine who contests the presidential election ... ; they would effectively be determining which persons will form the new executive ... «20 Other restrictions on the vote of no confidence include: a minimum of seven day's notice of the intended motion (»said to be necessary in order to prevent the government being overthrown on a snap vote«21 -within wh ich time the President could weil exercise his constitutional power of dissolution, or the party could take disciplinary action against the movers-to-be of the motion!); large percentages of vote (usually two thirds of the entire voting membership of the Assembly.) in support of the motion;22 the President re maining in office all the time while the ensuing elections are still in progress, or when their result is not yet known.23 According to Nwabueze, »the main reason why dissolu tion [in the aftermath of a no-confidence vote] is not likely to be a practical weapon is that [M.P.s], particularly in Africa, stand in great fear on an election, because o/ its cast and the danger 0/ lass 0/ seat with its perquisites. «24 He remarks that M.P.s are thus »quite disposed to agree to any eompromise that would avert for them a fi naneial eom mitment that might prove erippling.«25 The point, in effeet, is that reeourse to the ulti mate weapon, even where it is provided for, is not likely to be seen by M.P.s as being in their best interest; and on this mundane eonsideration, that deviee is of no consequenee in the relationship between the two branehes of government. It emerges that institutional fa ctors are at play whieh render endemie the ineffe etiveness of the typical Afriean parliament. This position, whieh is glaring when eompared with the Western experienee, must raise one's euriosity as to the experienee elsewhere in the Third World. It may be noted, if only briefly, that there was mueh greater eontinuity of institutions,26 from the colonial to the post-independenee era, in India: »The only major break with the eolonial past that oeeurred was in the field of self-government of rural areas.«27 The rela tively settled traditions of a large bureaueraey, a plurality of politieal parties, legislative bodies, and a eomplex set of eeonomie interests have apparently made for a differing or- der of political stability, with differing patterns of relationship between major public in stitutions, from the typical African situation.28 Such continuity also marked the development of institutions in the Pacific,29 a pattern perhaps fu rther enhanced by the small-scale character of the islands, the singular frailty of their economies, and their consequent dependence on Australia and New Zealand in particular, states that are at the very cent re of the Western tradition of governmental or ganisation. Additional insights are to be gained from recent developments in Kenya, wh ich suggest that the typical African parliament is potentially less effective still, in the task of power control, owing to certain most remarkable distortions in the usual integrity of public in stitutions, mainly attributable to informal formations within the executive domain. A Judicial inquiry into the conduct of one of such a standing, and in a situation so powerfully suggestive ofimproprieties in the leadership ranks, cou1d hardly fail to lead to instructive relations on the practical aspect of the relationship bet ween the legislature and the executive. The Commission's terms of reference included the mandate to inquire into the possible misuse by the Minister of his office »as Attorney-General andjor MinisterH, and into »allegations that he arrogated to hirnself the duties and powers of the President; that he solicited or received or attempted to receive or offered or made or attempted to make corrupt payments, granted favours or acted to the prejudice of individuals, to seek politi cal suport, to undermine the process 0/ democracy ... (both judges of some twenty years' standing) and Owuor (Mrs.), J.], set out in their task by adopting trite judicial principles. Relying on, inter alia, Hallett's Commissions and Boards 0/ Inquiry, 33 their lordships affirmed that this was »not ... a trial of any indivi dual«;34 »Our task as we saw it, was to determine whether the allegations specified in the terms of reference have or have not been established.«35 In hearing the 62 witnesses pro duced by assisting counsel, the Commissioners overwhelmingly adhered to the normal court rules: »We have followed the provisions of the Evidence Act (Cap. 80) governing the admission of relevant and hearsay evidence as weil as the rules of natural justice in so far as they are not excluded by the nature of the inquiry being a probe.«36 Parliament's charge of power restraint appears to be founded in the belief that each par liamentarian is a man of integrity, guided only by what he conceives to be the best inte rests of his electors, and of the country at large (of course, ta king into account any appli cable party commitments). The vitality of the legislature extends beyond the sanctity gi yen by the regulating normative framework, to include the calibre of its members, their autonomy and reliability.37 The Miller Report, by contrast, reveals that the typical African parliament may lack a foundation of inner strength, and may be so dangerously exposed to the manoeuvres of ambitious members of the executive who have forged their way into the vital bureaucra tic and technical apparatus of the state, that the basic setting no longer favours a mea ningful exercise of the power-restraint function. In these circumstances executive power becomes infinitely more difficult to control, as it tends to lose its integrated and »open« character, and instead to incorporate a variegated set of active, essentially self-seeking and unaccountable ingredients vying for the use or abuse of the machinery of public po wer. In this respect the Report is to be considered under the fo llowing sub-headings: (i) discre diting the »dignified element« as a foundation for parliament's cohesion; (ii) use of poli tical pressure to manipulate election candidature; (iii) employment offinancial superiori ty to neutralise the resoluteness of parliamentarians; (iv) manipulation of civic advanta- electoral choice has been much cultivated since independence, and, in a way, it may be said to constitute the very essence of Kenyan parliamentary democracy.54 It is clear from the Miller Report, however, that the said democratic element in the Ke nyan parliamentary system could not be taken for granted, as it has been exposed to gra ve risk by the political manoeuvres already recounted. Apparently in the quest for a semblance of legitimacy for his manipulations, and as a de vice for enhancing his standing with a view to a possible no-confidence motion, the Mini ster had sought to influence electoral choice in various ways. The Minister hirnself had resigned his position in the public service to move into a pre arranged constituency after it had conveniently been vacated through the resignation of the then sitting M. P., and the Minister's election was without opposition. While it is normal in Kenya to have a couple of uncontested seats at elections, the contrivance in which a popularly elected M. P. casually announces his resignation, to coincide with the resignation of an Attorney-General who then conveniently takes over the constituency, must raise questions as to the genuineness of parliamentary representation. The Commission accepted the evidence of one witness, to whom the Minister, just before he assumed that rank, had given the ultimatum of choosing between parliamentary can didature, and nearly thirty years of gainful association, as a director, with a private cor poration. When he opted for candidature, the Managing Director, on the nMinister'sH instructions, invited the witness to sign na request for his early retirement although he had done nothing to the detriment of the company and his retirement was completely to his disadvantage. He lost his house allowance, free fu rniture, educational fees for 13 children, medical benefits, and free car and petrolH.55 The consequence was so agonising and domestically disruptive that the witness nbecame a sick man as a resultH.56 He was also nforced to seil his shares in [al subsidiary companyH.57 His proposal to transfer his shares to one of his children was rejected because the )) Minister« ndid not want to hear about his children«.58 From these facts it appears probable that the nMinister« was apprehensive of the pro spect of the witness becoming an M. P., either because a different person was preferred, or because the witness's contribution in Parliament (to which he was elected against the odds) could not be relied on to advance significantly the nMinister's« cause. The nMini- .. who could do wh at ever they wanted for them. He appealed to them to give [the Minister] their support because he was a powerful man, one day he might even rule the country ... «60 The admiration of wealth, influence, and glamour, things without a rational or ethical fo undation, is a major hazard to wh ich the institution-building effort is exposed, and in particular in new states that still lack the right atmosphere for stable evolution. If it could be said that the democratically elected legislature was the fo remost point in popu lar choice, the Report has revealed that wealth and influence recently ca me into play to gravely undermine the cohesion, commitment and integrity of the Kenyan legislature as a crucial constitutional organ. It was established that when he retired as Attorney-General to become an M. P. and subsequently Minister, the Minister had benefited from certain (at least) censurable ar rangements: (a) an agreement had been made between hirn and an M. P. under wh ich the latter resigned his seat;61 (b) the said M. P. had nentered into the agreement as a result of The Minister had identified the nunco-operative« M. P. s and he has assigned his agents to win them over. A ndiffi cult« M. P. was so approached, with promises that the Minis ter would procure his elevation to Assistant Ministerial status. Past successes in such tactics were cited in persuasion. When the overtures were rebuffed , the Minister himself took up the task, inquiring of the M. P. nwhy your attitude ... is always negative«.65 The solicitation turned sour with the gaffe of attempting to lodge a wad of currency notes in the M. P.'s pocket, this being repelled amidst scornful yells from a couple of backbench anlookers. 66 But in such ruses the Minister also had some success. One M. P. was paid on two separa te occasions, for undertaking to attract more of his colleagues to the Minister's side. 67 Another M. P. reportedly received 400,000 Shillings (f 20,000) from the Minister, for use in influencing the outcome of civic elections in a crucial, municipality.68 The Minister also made a promise (not fu lfilled) to make a present of one of his limousines to another M. P. whom he was then wooing.69 On yet another occasion, an emissary approached a »diffi cultH M. P. saying: lt was established that the Minister, whose portfolio included immigration and police, had assumed personalised control over personnel and machinery involved in the issuance of passports, and the threat, and actural exercise, of withdrawal of passports now beca me a way of hampering the lawful movement of »difficu1tH M. P.s. J ust after the disturbances of I August, 1982 -the very prim um mobile of the inquirythe Minister ordered immigration officials to impound the passports of all »unco-opera tiveH M. P.s numbering then, 13.74 One such M. P. was directed by local police officers to move from his constituency -horne to the capital, where he arrived to learn that im migration officers had gained access to his residence and taken away his passport, 15 The fo llowing month the passport was returned to hirn, to enable hirn to attend a parliamen tary converence in Italy, subject to the condition that he adopted an accommodating at-titude towards the Minister. The Principal Immigration Officer (P. L 0.), also an emis sary of the Minister, summoned hirn on his return. As his attitude to the Minister rem ai ned antipathetic, the P.LO. »became annoyed and told [hirn) to surrender his pass port ... He never got it back«.76 Another M. P. also became a victim of this oppressive churlishness, but he stoically dismissed it all: »He has never gone back to collect it as he does not require a passport to go to his constituency« !77 The Minister's reliance on bureaucratic machinery to debilitate the legislature is already elear from the part played, for instance, by the then Chief Secretary [head of the civil service), or by the immigration officials who operated so as to incommode »unco-opera tive« M.P.s at every turn. Such arrogation of the state's established machinery reached the apotheosis in the realm of plain coercive power: selective prosecutions, and preventi ve detention. Frequently the Minister's agents would warn their victims that if they failed to support the Minister, they »would suffer«,78 »lose their seats«,79 would »[not) be safe80 -vague but most alarming insinuations. While still Attorney-General, the »Minister« had re monstrated with one back-bencher who, along with some other M.P.s, had frequently applauded the Vice-President when he walked into the chamber. The Minister warned that »if he and other M.P.s did not stop it they could suffer along with others who were opposed to his directives«.81 This particular M.P. was to be among other »difficult« M.P.s for whom files were opened in the Criminal Investigations Department when sub sequently this department became part of the Minister's portfolio. 82 The object, plainly, was to find the slightest excuse to initiate criminal proceedings, with the threat of loss of seats if senten ces exceeding six months should, in the event, be pronounced.83 One of the »unco-operative« M.P.s was in 1981 warned by the Minister's agent that he must eschew national politics »which was the main reason for the disagreement with [the Minister)«;84 the threat being that »he would end up in jail«, should he not comply. 85 In 1982 another M.P. proposed a motion urging the prosecution of a leading banker and elose ally of the Minister, investigations against whom had been terminated when the Minister was still Attorney-General, although inculpatory information could have been produced.86 With out pretending to rely on Section 26 of the Constitution (wh ich gives the Attorney-Ge neral a wide discretion in maUers of prosecution), the Minister thwarted the proposed motion by simply conveying to the proposer through emissaries that nhe would [be] put ... in trouble«87 if he went ahead. In 1978 two M.P.s had been prosecuted to convic tion, on orders of the Minister who was then AUorney-General, and sentenced to five years's imprisonment each, for the offence oftheft. But as early as 1980, and in complete violation of standing prison rules, the man who had just retired as Attorney-General, and was yet to become an M.P., let alone a Minister, caused prison officials to move the two ex-M.P.s to his horne, there to be released after being served with a stern warning in the presence of invited members of the public!88 Just after the detention, under the Pre servation of Public Security Act,89 of one of the ndifficult« M.P.s, and before the Com mission of Inquiry was appointed, one of the Minister's agents was citing as an example the detained M.P., and demanding of another that he should co-operate with the Minis ter or else meet with the same fate as had befallen his hapless colleauge.9o
IV. Conclusion
This article has sought to elucidate, with the aid of a current illustration, the operative character of the legislature-executive relationship in a representative African country. I t emerges that in spite of the glaring abuses of the integrity of parliament, leading mem bers of the executive, by their conduct, acknowledge the importance of the debating chamber, as the foremost council of interlocuteurs valables. The popular election, the classical democratic base, must be the genesis of parliament's stature in the configuration of principal institutions. Unfortunately, as this article re veals, complete probity cannot be guaranteed in the expression of that fu ndamental choice. There exists the capacity, within the ranks of the executive, to distort the true character of elections. Such distortion could extend to other aspects of the legislative entity. Parliament is a conglomeration of separate individuals, who are expected to operate as one solid core, a core of constitutional-legal standing, in the performance of specific tasks, in the interest of the nation at large. It is now clear that constitutional solidarity is liable to subversion from within the ranks of the executive -so much so, indeed, that parliamentary integrity is lost, and in its place a docile entity may remain, operating largely at the dictation of a wielder of power. The role that assertiveness over economic advantages, inter alia (notably the accompany ing influence with bureaucratic personneI), has played in subduing individual M.P.s, and thus neutralising the integrity of Parliament as a collective body, may suggest that the typical African country, in so far as it is yet to evolve a stable economic system with common Hethics« of access and participation, is unlikely to support fu lly the classical parliamentary institution, with autonomy and interna I discipline, in its relations with the power-wielding executive organ.91 Moreover, the ill-organised and under-developed eco nomic condition must create endless opportunities for abu se by the executive, or by ele ments therein, thus having a paralysing effect on traditional devices of power contro!. It is arguable that this impermanence in the sphere of economic gains has had implica tions for the possible scope of political discipline, so that the ranks of the executive can so crack that the regular power-wielding entity, the very target of parliamentary re straint, ceases to be identifiable, with the view of deploying regular control devices; in stead a variety of orderless units crop up that, because of their centrifugal character, and their unsystematic mode of operation, are hardly amenable to contro!. The evident surplusage of executive power that appears to be the rule in most of Africa, thus defies all effective control, by the legislative or any other constitutional organ. The present law relating to third world debts is primarily a law of private international contracts. This subjects them to national legal systems which are not equipped to consi der anthing other than the national interest dimension of the contracts, and, of course their exact terms. So even the banks themselves rarely resort to their chosen jurisdic tions. How is the laywer to react to de facto renegotiation, and, in effect modification of loan agreements? The adjustments made are conditioned by the absence of an effective inter national monetary legal order. How might such an order be constructed? The debate ab out the role of the IMF and the World Bank is conducted in purely economic terms, with all the arguments employed heavily contested on all sides. The degree of disagreement about global economic policy is a reflection of the lack of fo undation for global political and legal integration. However one contribution to a pu blic international monetary order would be to appeal to the measure of fa irness implicit in the concept of the souvereign equality of states. No state should be expected to accept restrictions upon its constraction of public debt wh ich are not accepted by all states. In ternational and public lawyers should work to encourage the development of standards for the contraction of public debt, from whatever source, which would be common to both developed and developing countries. Private banks should be expected to respect these standards. Affirmations of dangers inherent in public are not always attended by concrete examples of practical situations, systematically presented and analysed. This article attempts to il lustrate the theoretical proposition that the governmental process is apt to veer towards authoritarianism, in the absence of c1ear mechanisms of contro!. The focus is the rela tionship between the executive and the legislature in the typical African state. The sub stance of the illustration is drawn from the report of the Miller Commission of Inquiry, which as appointed by President Moi of Kenya in 1983, to investigate inter aUa the acti vities of a fo rmer leading Minister, with regard to conduct in the office, to relations with the public, and to various public bodies entrusted with defined obligations. It emerges from the study that, in circumstances of indiscipline, or schism in the ranks of the execu tive, government malcontents will use a variety of techniques to enfeeble the integrity of Parliament, which appears to be seen always as the true base of national interlocuteurs. Parliament's strength is sapped not only in this way; the now ill-defined fo rmation of ex ecutive -in the public eye -becomes still more diffi cult to contro!. Abuse of power then has the tendency to multiply considerably. It is the recipe for authoritarianism.
Some Thoughts on the Interim Preservation or the Namibian Fishing Heritage
By D. J. Devine
The raison d'etre of this paper is the fact that no immediate solution of the South West AfricajNamibia political problem appears to be in sight and that the offshore living ma rine resources of the territory are being depleted in this period of political and legal un certainty. The principal element which militates against the proper conservation ofthese resources in the absence of a 200 nautical mile fi shing zone opposable to all states and re cognized and respected by them. The paper does not address the problem of solving the political problems of the territory but investigates what might be done by way of interim measures to preserve the resources in question on the assumption that the overall political resolution of the territory's status may not be fo rthcoming for so me time. Inadequacies in the existing legal mechanisms are highlighted and a plea is made for co-operation bet ween the various political actors in an effort to preserve such valuable resources. Sugge stions are made as to possible characteristics of such co-operation and ideas such as in fo rmality of arrangements, provisionality pending fi nal solutions, transparency and con sultation are examined. The hope is expressed that practical common sense will over come apriori political positions in the search for an interim solution to avoid the conti nu ing depletion of the resources.
